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Abstract
This report explores the development of exploitation theory in mathe-
matical Marxian economics by reviewing the main controversies surround-
ing the definition of exploitation since the contribution of Okishio (1963).
The report first examines the robustness and economic implications of the
debates on the Fundamental Marxian Theorem, developed mainly in the
1970s and 1980s, followed by the property relation theory of exploitation
by Roemer (1982). Then, the more recent exploitation theory proposed
by Vrousalis (2013) and Wright (2000) is introduced, before examining its
economic implications using a simple economic model. Finally, the report
introduces and comments on recent axiomatic studies of exploitation by
focusing on the work of Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a).
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1 Introduction
In Marxian economics, the capitalist economy is depicted as an exploitative
system. The validity of this basic Marxian insight has been recognized since
the work of Okishio (1963), and proved by the so-called Fundamental Marxian
Theorem (FMT), which assumes a simple Leontief economic model and uses
Okishio’s definition of exploitation. However, the FMT loses robustness once a
more complex economic model is considered. Moreover, the Generalized Com-
modity Exploitation Theorem indicates that the definition of exploitation à la
Okishio (1963)—Morishima (1973) does not properly capture the core feature of
exploitation as a concept of social relations. Instead, it simply represents the
productiveness of the economic system as a whole.
Given these two criticisms, Roemer (1982, 1994) proposed the property rela-
tional definition of exploitation (PR-exploitation), which recognizes exploitation
as a concept of social relations, as stipulated by the ownership structure of pro-
ductive assets. Though PR-exploitation has nothing to do with the classical
labor theory of value, it is a mathematical extension of the Okishio definition.
Moreover, it is generally true that, under the definition of PR-exploitation, the
capitalist economy can be conceived of as exploitative. However, the PR theory
of exploitation denies the relevance of exploitation as a primary normative con-
cern: Roemer (1994) argued that the primary normative concern should be the
injustice of the unequal distribution of productive assets, rather than exploita-
tion per se. His criticism of exploitation was so influential that the Marxian
theory of exploitation was almost dismissed, in that, until recently, there had
been no substantial studies in this field since that of Roemer (1994).
However, the Marxian notion of exploitation has now been revived, and there
have been some significant recent developments in the theory of exploitation as
the social relations of the unequal exchange of labor (UE-exploitation). This re-
port examines, among others, the proper conceptual definitions of exploitation
developed by Vrousalis (2013), in political philosophy, and by Wright (2000) in
sociology. Both approaches address the systematic generation of an unequal ex-
change of labor due to the asymmetric power relations embedded in the trading
structure. Interestingly, using the new approach to exploitation à la Vrousalis
(2013)—Wright (2000), Roemer’s claim that the theory of exploitation is reduced
to a theory of distributive injustice can be invalidated. As a result, the notion
of UE-exploitation has been restored as a primary normative concern.
Given this new trend, one of the relevant subjects for Marxian exploitation
theory is to properly formulate UE-exploitation, which has developed signifi-
cantly as a result of an axiomatic theory of exploitation initiated by Veneziani
and Yoshihara. Among their works, this report examines their Profit-Exploitation
Correspondence Principle (PECP) [Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a)] which is
proposed to characterize axiomatically the eligible definitions of exploitation.
Then, an extension of the exploitation form à la “New Interpretation” is shown
to be uniquely eligible among the main definitions provided by current literature.
In the following discussion, section 2 examines the development of exploita-
tion theory in mathematical Marxian economics, from the contribution of Ok-
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ishio (1963) until the 1990s. First, this section discusses the robustness and
economic implications of the debates on the Fundamental Marxian Theorem,
developed mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by a discussion of Roemer’s
(1982) property relation theory of exploitation. Section 3 introduces the recent
trend in exploitation theory initiated by Vrousalis (2013) and Wright (2000),
and then examines its economic implications using a simple economic model.
Section 4 provides an overview of the recent axiomatic studies of exploitation
by focusing on Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a). Finally, section 5 concludes
the report and provides a perspective of the remaining subjects on exploitation
theory in mathematical Marxian economics.
2 Themain developments in mathematical Marx-
ian economics from the 1970s until the 1990s
In this section, we provide an overview of the main arguments in mathematical
Marxian economics developed up to the 1990s. We begin with the significant
contribution by Nobuo Okishio, known for the Fundamental Marxian Theorem,
and then discuss the successive developments and relevant debates on this theo-
rem, mainly initiated by Michio Morishima and John Roemer during the 1970s
and 1980s.
2.1 The formulation of labor exploitation by Okishio and
the Fundamental Marxian Theorem
Let R be the set of real numbers and R+ (resp. R− ) the set of non-negative
(resp. non-positive) real numbers. For all x, y ∈ Rn, x = y if and only if xi = yi
(i = 1, . . . , n); x ≥ y if and only if x = y and x 6= y; and x > y if and only if
xi > yi (i = 1, . . . , n). For any sets, X and Y , X ⊆ Y if and only if for any
x ∈ X, x ∈ Y ; X = Y if and only if X ⊆ Y and Y ⊆ X; X ( Y if and only if
X ⊆ Y and X 6= Y .
An economy comprises a set of agents, N = {1, .., N}, with generic element
ν ∈ N . Denote the cardinal number of this set by N . Similarly, the cardinal
number for any subset, S ⊆ N , is denoted by S. There are n types of (purely
private) commodities that are transferable in markets. The production technol-
ogy, commonly accessible by any agent, is represented by a Leontief production
technology, (A,L), where A is an n× n non-negative square matrix of material
input coefficients, and L is a 1 × n positive vector of labor input coefficients.
Here, A is assumed to be productive and indecomposable. For the sake of sim-
plicity, let us assume that for each production period, the maximal amount of
labor supply by every agent is equal to unity and there is no difference in labor
skills (human capital) among agents. Let b ∈ Rn+ be the basic consumption
bundle, which is the minimum consumption necessary for every agent when
supplying one unit of labor. Let ω ∈ Rn+\ {0} be the social endowments of
commodities.
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Assuming a private ownership economy, let ων be the initial endowment
of commodities owned by agent ν ∈ N . In the following discussion, let W ≡
{ν ∈ N | ων = 0} be the set of propertyless agents. Typically, W would repre-
sent the set of workers who own no material means of production. In summary,
one capitalist economy is described by a profile
­N ; (A,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
.
Let v represent a vector of each commodity’s labor value. Note that, ac-
cording to the classical economics and Marx, the labor value of commodity i,
vi, is defined as the sum of the amount of labor directly and/or indirectly input
to produce one unit of this commodity. Therefore, this value is mathematically
formulated by the solution of the system of equations, v = vA+ L. Here, since
the matrix A is productive and the vector L is positive, v ∈ Rn++ is the unique
solution of the system of equations. Then, the labor value of any commodity
vector c ∈ Rn+ is given by vc = 0.
Let w ∈ R+ represent a wage rate. Assume that any agent, ν ∈ W, can
purchase the consumption vector, b, with wage revenue, w, per working day.
Moreover, let p ∈ Rn+\ {0} represent a vector of market prices for n types of
commodities. Then:
Definition 1: A balanced-growth equilibrium for a capitalist economy
­N ; (A,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
is a profile (p,w) ∈ Rn+1+ \ {0} that satisfies the following:
p = (1 + π) [pA+ wL] & w = pb,
where the scalar π = 0 represents the equal profit rate.
Definition 2 [Okishio (1963)]: In a capitalist economy
­N ; (A,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
,
labor exploitation exists if and only if vb < 1.
That is, within one working day, normalized to unity, vb corresponds to the
necessary labor hours for each ν ∈ W, so that 1 − vb represents the surplus
labor hours. Therefore, the existence of labor exploitation is none other than
the existence of positive surplus labor.
Under Definition 2, Okishio proves the validity of the basic Marxian view,
which conceives the capitalist economy as exploitative, by the Fundamental
Marxian Theorem, as follows:
Fundamental Marxian Theorem (FMT) [Okishio (1963)]: Let (p,w) be a
balanced-growth equilibrium associated with equal profit rate π for capitalist
economy
­N ; (A,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
. Then:
π > 0⇔ vb < 1.
Morishima’s (1973) introduction of this theorem prompted hot debate on its
robustness and implications. There have been many studies on the robustness
of the FMT. Of these, we review the work of Morishima (1974) and Roemer
(1980). Both works discuss the generalization of the FMT to a more general
model than that of the Leontief type, in order to show the robustness of the
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FMT in economies with fixed capital, joint production, and the possibility of
technical choices.1
To formulate such economies, the von Neumann production technology, rep-
resented by a profile (A,B,L), is introduced. Note that A is an n×m matrix,
the generic component of which, aij = 0, represents the amount of commodity
i used as an input to operate one unit of the j-th production process; B is an
n×m matrix, the generic component of which, bij = 0, represents the amount of
commodity i produced as an output by operating one unit of the j-th production
process; and L is a 1×m positive row vector of direct labor input coefficients.
Let xj = 0 represent an activity level of the j-th production process, so that
a profile of social production activities is represented by a non-negative m × 1
column vector, x ≡ (xj)j=1,...,m. In the following discussion, we will sometimes
use the notation Ai (resp. Bi) to refer to the i-th row vector of A (resp. B).
For a von Neumann capitalist economy,
­N ; (A,B,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
, we can
respectively define the notions of balanced-growth equilibrium, labor values,
and labor exploitation as follows:
Definition 3: A balanced-growth equilibrium for a capitalist economy,
­N ; (A,B,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
is a profile of non-negative and non-zero vectors, ((p,w) , x) ∈ Rn+1+ ×Rm+ , that
satisfy the following:
pB 5 (1 + π) [pA+ wL] ; Bx = (1 + π) [A+ bL]x; pBx > 0; & w = pb.
Definition 4 [Morishima (1974)]: Given a capitalist economy,
­N ; (A,B,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
,
the labor value of a consumption bundle, c ∈ Rn+, is the solution, Lxc, of the
following constrained optimization program:
min
x=0
Lx s.t. [B −A]x = c.
Definition 5 [Morishima (1974)]: In a capitalist economy,
­N ; (A,B,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
,
labor exploitation exists if and only if Lxb < 1.
Morishima (1974) shows that, under the balanced-growth equilibrium, the
equivalence between the existence of labor exploitation and the positive equal
profit rate is preserved, even in the von Neumann capitalist economy. This is
formalized in the following theorem:
Generalized Fundamental Marxian Theorem (GFMT) [Morishima (1974)]:
Let ((p,w) , x) be a balanced-growth equilibrium associated with the equal profit
rate, π, for capitalist economy ­N ; (A,B,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
. Then:
π > 0⇔ Lxb < 1.
1There is also another generalization of the FMT to a Leontief economy with heterogeneous
labor, as proposed by Morishima (1973), Bowles and Gintis (1977, 1978), and Krauze (1981).
The focus of this line of research was to solve the reduction problem of heterogeneous labor
into one common unit, and/or to solve the dilemma of the heterogeneity of labor and the
respective rates of exploitation. So far, the robustness of the FMT in this line of generalization
has remained firm.
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In contrast, Roemer (1980) defines an alternative equilibrium notion, called
a reproducible solution, which is defined to preserve its coherency with the profit-
maximizing behavior of every capital owner, ν ∈ N\W. It then examines the
robustness of the FMT under this equilibrium. That is:
Definition 6 [Roemer (1980)]: A reproducible solution for a capitalist econ-
omy,
­N ; (A,B,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
, is a profile of non-negative and non-zero vectors,
((p∗, w∗) , x∗) ∈ Rn+1+ ×Rm+ , that satisfies the following:2
(a) xν∗ ∈ argmaxxν=0 p∗ [B −A]xν − w∗Lxν , such that [p∗A+ w∗L]xν 5
p∗ων (∀ν ∈ N\W), where x∗ ≡Pν∈N\W xν∗;
(b) [B −A]x∗ = bLx∗;
(c) w∗ = p∗b;
(d) [A+ bL]x∗ 5 ω.
Roemer’s Fundamental Marxian Theorem (RFMT) [Roemer (1980)]:
For any capitalist economy,
­N ; (A,B,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
, and any reproducible so-
lution, ((p∗, w∗) , x∗), the following two statements are equivalent:
(1) p∗ [B −A]x∗ − w∗Lx∗ > 0⇔ Lxb < 1;
(2) ∀x, x0 = 0, Lx = Lx0, [∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : (Bi −Ai)x > (Bi −Ai)x0]⇒ ∃x00 =
0 : Lx00 = Lx0, (Bi −Ai)x00 = (Bi −Ai)x0, & ∃i0 ∈ {1, . . . , n} : (Bi0 −Ai0)x00 >
(Bi0 −Ai0)x.
In the above theorem, statement (1) implies the equivalence between the
positivity of total profit, p∗ [B −A]x∗ − w∗Lx∗, at the reproducible solution
and the existence of labor exploitation in terms of Definition 5. In contrast,
statement (2) characterizes the necessary and sufficient condition for statement
(1) to hold. Suppose two production activities, say x and x0, that have the
same corresponding labor inputs. Then, according to statement (2), if the net
output of some commodity, say i, via activity x is strictly greater than that via
activity x0, then there is another commodity, say i0, such that the net output
of i0 via some suitable production activity x00, which may be identical to or
different from x0, is strictly greater than that via x. This statement can be
interpreted as a condition that excludes the possibility of production via an
inferior process. Thus, the RFMT implies that, in any capitalist economy,
the equivalence relationship between positive profits and the existence of labor
exploitation holds for any reproducible solution if and only if there is no inferior
production process (in terms of the condition (2)) in this economy.
To see the difference between the GFMT and RFMT, consider the following
example.
Example 1: Consider a von Neumann economy,
­N ; (A,B,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
, such
2As Roemer (1980) explicitly shows, there is essential no difference between the balanced-
growth equilibrium (given as Definition 1) and the reproducible solution in capitalist economies
with a Leontief production technology. However, these two notions of equilibrium are different
whenever a more general model of capitalist economies is considered.
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that
A =
∙
1 1
1 0
¸
, B =
∙
2 3
2 1
¸
, L = (1, 1) , b =
∙
1
1
¸
, and ω =
∙
2
1
¸
.
In this economy, condition (2) of the RFMT is violated, because B − A =∙
1 2
1 1
¸
and L = (1, 1), which implies that the 1st production process is inferior
to the 2nd production process.
Note that in this economy, the set of the balanced-growth equilibria is char-
acterized by ©
((p,w) , x) ∈ {((0, 1) , 1)} ×R2+ | x 6= 0
ª
,
where all balanced-growth equilibria are associated with π = 0. In contrast, the
set of reproducible solutions is characterized by½
((p∗, w∗) , x∗) ∈ R2+ × {1} ×
½∙
0
1
¸¾
| p∗1 + p∗2 = 1
¾
,
where, if p∗1 > 0, then π∗ = p
∗
1
2p∗1+p
∗
2
> 0; while, if p∗1 = 0, then π∗ = 0.
Next, in this economy, the labor value of the commodity bundle b is Lxb = 1,
where xb is any non-negative vector satisfying xb1 + x
b
2 = 1. Thus, according to
Definition 5, there is no exploitation in this economy.
Therefore, the GFMT holds in this economy, since in any balanced growth-
equilibrium, the corresponding profit rate is π = 0, while there is no exploitation.
However, we can find a reproducible solution ((p∗, w∗) , x∗), with p∗1 > 0, whose
corresponding profit rate is π∗ > 0. Thus, if the economy arrives at this equi-
librium, then positive profits are generated in conjunction with no exploitation,
which violates condition (1) of the RFMT. This contrast between the GFMT
and RFMT can be observed when the economy does not satisfy condition (2)
of the RFMT.
Next, we comment briefly on the Okishio—Morishima proposal for the for-
mulation of labor exploitation given in Definitions 2, 4, and 5. Firstly, these
definitions presume the employment relation of capital and labor in the pro-
duction process. Secondly, these are faithful to the Marxian theory of surplus
value in that labor exploitation is defined as the existence of positive surplus
value. In other words, the supply of labor time exceeds the necessary labor time
(the value of labor power). Thirdly, these definitions are consistent with the
basic perception of the labor theory of value, since they are formulated com-
pletely independently of price information. As a result of these properties, the
Okishio—Morishima formulation of labor exploitation is conceivably faithful to
the conceptual definition of exploitation given in Marx’s Das Kapital.
The works developed by Morishima and Roemer indicate that we cannot
generally confirm the basic Marxian perception of the capitalist economy as
exploitative. Firstly, according to Morishima’s GFMT, it is true even under a
general economic environment with the possibility of fixed capital, joint produc-
tion, and technical choices that the necessary and sufficient condition for positive
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profits is the existence of labor exploitation, as long as only a balanced-growth
equilibrium is assumed. However, secondly, the RFMT suggests that, given the
Okishio—Morishima definition of exploitation, once we extend our concern from
the balanced-growth equilibrium to the reproducible solution, the equivalence
between positive profits and the existence of exploitation no longer holds in a
general economic environment with the possibility of fixed capital, joint produc-
tion, and technical choices. Note that this extension of the notion of equilibrium
seems reasonable whenever we view a capitalist economy as a resource allocation
mechanism working via the capitalists’ profit-seeking motivation under market
competition.
There is another, even more serious criticism of the FMT, which raises doubt
about the FMT characterizing a capitalist economy as an exploitative system.
This criticism is based on the Generalized Commodity Exploitation The-
orem (GCET), as shown by Bowles and Gintis (1981), as well as Samule-
son (1982) and Roemer (1982). To see the GCET, we return to a Leontief
capitalist economy,
­N ; (A,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
. Then, take any commodity, k, and
let v(k)i , for each commodity i, be the aggregate amount of commodity k di-
rectly and/or indirectly input to produce one unit of the commodity i. Let
v(k) ≡
³
v
(k)
i
´
i∈{1,...,n} be a vector of commodity k-values. Analogical to the
case of the vector of labor values, v(k) can be defined as the solution of the
following system of equations:
v(k) = v(k) [A+ bL] +
³
1− v(k)k
´
[Ak + bkL] ,
where Ak is the k-th row vector of the matrix A. Then:
Definition 7 [Bowles & Gintis (1981)]: In a capitalist economy,
­N ; (A,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
,
the exploitation of commodity k exists if and only if v(k)k < 1.
Generalized Commodity Exploitation Theorem (GCET) [Bowles & Gin-
tis (1981)]: Let (p,w) be a balanced growth-equilibrium associated with the
equal profit rate, π, for capitalist economy ­N ; (A,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
. Then:
π > 0⇔ vb < 1⇔ v(k)k < 1.
Establishing the GCET leads us to see the Okishio—Morishima definition
of labor exploitation as representing the productiveness of an overall economic
system, which uses labor power as a factor of production in a technologically
efficient way to guarantee the possibility of surplus products. This is because the
existence of commodity k’s exploitation is the exact numerical representation
of the productiveness of an overall economic system if we select commodity k
as the numéraire, in the sense that the overall economic system is productive
enough to guarantee the possibility of surplus products via the technologically
efficient use of commodity k as a factor of production. Analogically, we can
interpret the existence of labor exploitation as the numerical representation
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of the productiveness of an overall economic system by selecting labor as the
numéraire. Therefore, the equivalence between the FMT and GCET indicates
that the necessary and sufficient condition for positive profits is that the whole
economic system is sufficiently productive to guarantee the possibility of surplus
products, which is a trivial proposition. This view prompted the criticism of
Okishio’s original motivation and interpretation of the FMT: that it may simply
affirm the productiveness of the capitalist economy, rather than the Marxian
perception of the capitalist economy as an exploitative system.3
2.2 The property relations definition of exploitation by
Roemer (1982)
Recall that the Okishio—Morishima definition of labor exploitation is a formu-
lation of the unequal exchange of labor (UEL), presuming that the UEL repre-
sents an essential feature of the notion of exploitation. In contrast, John Roemer
(1994) argues that exploitation as the UEL should be replaced with exploitation
as the distributional consequences of an unjust inequality in the distribution of
productive assets and resources. What constitutes unjust inequality? Roemer
(1994) argues that this is the unequal distribution of alienable assets, which is
unjust in capitalist societies.4
Based on this view, Roemer (1994) proposes the property relational definition
of exploitation (PR-exploitation). That is, a group or individual (capitalisti-
cally) exploits another group or individual if and only if the following three
conditions hold: (i) were the latter to withdraw from the society, endowed with
his/her per capita share of social alienable goods and with his/her own labor
and skill, then he/she would be better off in his/her welfare than at the present
allocation; (ii) were the former to withdraw under the same conditions, then
he/she would be worse off in his/her welfare than at the present allocation; and
(iii) were the latter to withdraw from the society, endowed with his/her own
endowments, then the former would be worse off than at present.
Such a definition can be formulated within the framework of cooperative
game theory. Let (V 1, . . ., V N ) ∈ RN+ be a profile of each agent’s welfare level in
the present society. Let P (N ) be the power set of N and let K : P (N )→ R+ be
a characteristic function of the society, which assigns to every coalition S ⊆ N ,
with S agents, an aggregate payoff, K(S), if it withdraws from the economy.
Then:
Definition 8 [Roemer (1982)]: At a welfare allocation (V 1, . . ., V N ) of the
present society, coalition S ⊆ N is exploited (resp. exploiting) with respect
3For a more detailed discussion on the implications of the GCET, see Roemer (1982) and
Yoshihara and Veneziani (2010a, b). In addition, some recent literature criticizes the GCET,
supporting the Okishio—Morishima definition of labor exploitation. For more information, see
Fujimoto and Fujita (2008) and Matsuo (2009).
4Alienable assets are typically financial assets and/or material capital goods. In contrast,
inalienable assets are typically talents and/or skills immanent in individuals.
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to alternative K if and only if the complement T ≡ N\S is in a relation of
dominance to S,5 and the following two conditions hold:
(i)
P
ν∈S V ν < K(S) (resp.
P
ν∈S V ν > K(S));
(ii)
P
ν∈T V ν > K(T ) (resp.
P
ν∈T V ν < K(T )).
That is, condition (i) of Definition 8 states that an exploited coalition would be
improved with respect to its aggregate payoff by withdrawing from the present
society to the alternative society characterized by the allocation rule K. Con-
dition (ii) implies that the complement of the exploited coalition would become
worse off by withdrawing from the present society to the alternative society.
It may be supposed that there exists a sub-coalition of the complement that
exploits the exploited coalition in the present society.
What kinds of features would characteristic function K have to include as
a welfare allocation rule of the alternative society? This depends on what the
alternative society would be. For instance, if the present society is a capitalist
society, function K would be defined in terms of the welfare allocation imple-
mentable from the equal distribution of alienable assets. That is, firstly, let
u : Rn+ × [0, 1] → R+ be the welfare function of each agent that associates a
non-negative real number, u (c, l), with each c ∈ Rn+ of consumption vectors
and each l ∈ [0, 1] of labor supply. Secondly, define feasible allocations for an
economic environment with a Leontief production technology:
Definition 9: Given a Leontief production economy, hN ; (A,L) ;ωi, profile¡
(cν , lν)ν∈N , x
¢ ∈ ¡Rn+ × [0, 1]¢N × Rn+ constitutes a feasible allocation if and
only if the following conditions hold for this profile:
(i) Ax 5 ω;
(ii) Lx =
P
ν∈N lν ;
(iii) (I −A)x =Pν∈N cν .
Denote the set of feasible allocations for economy hN ; (A,L) ;ωi by Z (ω). If a
feasible allocation
¡
(c∗ν , l∗ν)ν∈N , x∗
¢ ∈ Z (ω) is implemented as a reproducible
solution for the capitalist economy
­N ; (A,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
, then its corresponding
welfare allocation is denoted by (V ∗1, . . ., V ∗N ), where V ∗ν ≡ u (c∗ν , l∗ν), for
each ν ∈ N .
Now, we denote a welfare allocation rule of an alternative society to the
capitalist society by KCE : P (N ) → R+. For each coalition, S ⊆ N , consider
the following optimization program (CE):
max
((cν ,lν)ν∈S ,x)
X
ν∈S
u (cν , lν)
s.t. (I −A)x =X
ν∈S
cν ; Lx =
X
ν∈S
lν 5 S; & Ax 5 S
N
ω. (CE)
5Note that there is no explicit formal definition of the dominance relation of coalition S
and coalition T . Roemer (1982) simply states that the notion of ‘the dominance relation’ here
is given mainly based on a sociological concept.
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Denote the solution of program (CE) by
¡
(c∗∗ν , l∗∗ν)ν∈S , xS
¢
. Then, the char-
acteristic function, KCE , is defined by KCE (S) ≡Pν∈S u (c∗∗ν , l∗∗ν), for each
S ⊆ N .
The program (CE) presumes a counterfactual situation in which a group,
S, withdraws from the capitalist society to form a commune comprising the
members of this group, and then investigates the expected sum of the welfare
levels achievable in that alternative society. That is, the program maximizes the
aggregate of the welfare levels attainable by the group S endowed with its ac-
cessible aggregate capital stock, SNω. Here, SN ω is the sum of the capital stocks
of all members in S derived from the counterfactual equal distribution of the
overall material means of production, ω. It is the solution of this program that
constitutes the value KCE (S) as the total payoff attainable by the group S if
it forms a communal society by withdrawing from the present society. Follow-
ing Roemer (1982), the property-relational exploitation of a capitalist
society (capitalist PR-exploitation) is defined by means of this KCE , as
follows:
Definition 10 [Roemer (1982)]: At a welfare allocation (V ∗1, . . ., V ∗N ) of a
capitalist economy,
­N ; (A,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
, coalition S ⊆ N is capitalistically
exploited (resp. capitalistically exploiting) if and only if the complement T ≡
N\S is in a relation of dominance to S, and the following two conditions hold:
(i)
P
ν∈S V ∗ν < KCE(S) (resp.
P
ν∈S V ∗ν > KCE(S));
(ii)
P
ν∈T V ∗ν > KCE(T ) (resp.
P
ν∈T V ∗ν < KCE(T )).
That is, condition (i) of Definition 10 states that a capitalistically exploited
coalition is worse off in terms of its attainable payoff in the capitalist society than
in the communal society endowed with an equal distribution of material means of
production. Moreover, condition (ii) of Definition 10 states that the complement
of the capitalistically exploited coalition would be better off in terms of its
attainable payoff in the capitalist society than in the communal society of this
complement. It would be expected that a capitalistically exploiting coalition
would exist within this complement. In addition to the definition given in
Roemer (1982), Roemer (1994) introduces a third condition, as noted above.
This condition suggests that the aggregate welfare of group T would be worse
off if group S withdraws, taking ωS ≡ Pν∈S ων with it from the capitalist
society. This condition would naturally follow whenever the welfare allocation
(V ∗1, . . . , V ∗N ) is derived from the reproducible solution in our setting of the
Leontief capitalist economy.
A non-exploitative society in terms of Definition 10 can be formulated as a
society without an unequal distribution of material capital goods, as confirmed
by the following definition.
Definition 11 [Roemer (1982)]: For any Leontief production economy, hN ; (A,L) ;ωi,
a welfare allocation (V ∗1, . . . , V ∗N ) lies in a communal core if and only if any
coalition S ⊆ N is not capitalistically exploited by the allocation.
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Definition 11 implies that the core property of a communal society is equivalent
to the non-existence of capitalist exploitation in terms of Definition 10.
What types of feasible allocations can a communal core contain? To answer
this question, consider the program (CE) in the case of S = N , and denote
the corresponding optimal solution by
¡
(c∗∗ν , l∗∗ν)ν∈N , xN
¢
. Note that, each
agent has a common welfare function and common level of labor skill. There-
fore, for the sake of simplicity, we can restrict our attention to the symmetric
allocation in which all agents consume the same consumption bundle, c∗∗N ,
and supply the same labor hours, l∗∗N . Hence, the corresponding welfare allo-
cation, (V N∗ν)ν∈N , has the property that, for any ν, ν0 ∈ N , V N∗ν = V N∗ν0
holds, where V N∗ν ≡ u ¡c∗∗N , l∗∗N ¢. In this case, for any coalition, S ( N ,P
ν∈S V N∗ν = Su
¡
c∗∗N , l∗∗N
¢
= Su
¡
c∗∗S , l∗∗S
¢
= KCE(S) holds, which im-
plies that the welfare allocation (V N∗ν)ν∈N lies in the communal core. That is,
the welfare allocation lies in the communal core if, (i) it is generated from the
situation in which all individuals in N constitute a communal society, (ii) all
individuals engage in a cooperative production activity using the overall set of
material capital goods, ω, (iii) all individuals share the reward of the activity
equally. Such an allocation is a non-exploitative allocation in terms of Definition
10.6
Unlike the traditional Marxian theory of exploitation, the capitalist PR-
exploitation formulated in Definition 10 never refers to the UEL. Rather, it
straightforwardly refers to the unequal distribution of material means of pro-
duction as the basic feature of exploitation in the capitalist economy. However,
Definition 10 is an extension of the Okishio—Morishima definition of labor ex-
ploitation, as pointed out by Roemer (1982). Indeed, given the reproducible so-
lution ((p∗, w∗) , x∗) in the capitalist economy
­N ; (A,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
discussed
in the last section, if any worker, ν ∈ W, is identified as an exploited agent
by the Okishio—Morishima definition of exploitation, then he/she would be a
member of an exploited coalition in terms of Definition 10. This is because,
while each worker, ν ∈ W, receives, at most, the welfare level u (b, 1) in the
present reproducible solution, ((p∗, w∗) , x∗), they can all enjoy a higher level of
welfare than u (b, 1) by withdrawing, with the material capital goods WN ω, from
the capitalist economy to form their own commune: each worker in the com-
mune of W can access a welfare level available from the revenue, π∗ p∗ωN + w∗,
while his/her welfare level, u (b, 1), under the capitalist economy is simply de-
rived from his/her wage revenue, w∗ = p∗b. Thus, every exploited agent in
terms of the Okishio—Morishima definition is a member of an exploited group
in terms of Definition 10. Furthermore, Definition 10 allows us to identify all
exploited agents beyond the members of W, as well as all members of the ex-
ploiters. Henceforth, the PR theory of exploitation provides a finer definition of
exploitation than do the theories of the UEL, such as the Okishio—Morishima
approach. In summary, whenever we are interested in exploitation as a feature
of social relations, Roemer (1994) concludes that we should discuss it based on
the PR definition rather than the UEL definition of exploitation.
6For a more detailed discussion, see Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013b; section 4.4).
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Given this alternative definition of exploitation, Roemer (1994) questions
whether the issue of exploitation is an intrinsic normative problem worth dis-
cussing in the context of contemporary societies. That is, he argues that ex-
ploitation is per se, at best a morally secondary phenomenon. Instead, he be-
lieves that the normatively primary concern that we should be addressing is the
injustice of property relations. For instance, according to Definition 10, capital-
ist PR-exploitation exists whenever alienable capital goods are unequally dis-
tributed. However, though inequality in the distribution of alienable resources
could be conceived of as unjust when all agents are homogenous in their welfare
functions and skills, the issue is less straightforward when these functions and
skills are heterogeneous and diverse. Given that the heterogeneity and diversity
of agents are generic features of contemporary societies, it seems necessary for
us to develop a more comprehensive theory of distributive justice, which should
be the subject of normatively primary concern in contemporary societies, rather
than the development of exploitation theory.
So, what kinds of theories of distributive justice should be addressed? As a
solution, Roemer (1994, 1998) has developed a theory of equality of opportunity,
based on the debates on equality by Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989), and Cohen
(1989). His theory can be summarized by the following axiom:
Principle of voluntary disadvantage: The distribution of alienable resources
between any agents, ν ∈ N and ν0 ∈ N , is just if and only if any difference in ν’s
and ν0’s enjoyment of the resources reflects a difference in their choices, desserts,
or faults.
Any inequality violating this principle implies involuntary disadvantage, which
should be deemed distributive injustice.
Note that involuntary disadvantage implies disadvantages due to circumstan-
tial factors for which individuals should not be deemed responsible, such as those
due to household environments, native talents, disaster, and so on. It is reason-
able to regard an agent’s disadvantage in private ownership of material capital
goods as involuntary, at least in his/her initial stage of economic activities.
For instance, in the above-mentioned capitalist economy,
­N ; (A,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
,
there is supposedly no difference in agents’ native talents, and the possibility of
disaster is not considered. Therefore, it is the inequality in private ownership
of material capital goods that is the sole source of involuntary disadvantages
in this economy. In this respect, an equilibrium allocation in the economy­N ; (A,L) ; (ων)ν∈N
®
implies involuntary disadvantages if and only if it entails
capitalist PR-exploitation in terms of Definition 10.
In summary, given the above arguments, the existence of exploitation, à la
Roemer’s theory of PR-exploitation, is equivalent to distributive injustice, à la
Roemer’s theory of equality of opportunity, at least in any Leontief capitalist
economy with no heterogeneity or diversity of agents. Hence, in such homoge-
neous societies, it is sufficient to argue distributive injustice in terms of the the-
ory of equality of opportunity. Moreover, the theory of equality of opportunity
can diagnose allocations of alienable resources as unjust, even in societies with
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heterogeneity and/or diversity among agents. Therefore, the issue of exploita-
tion can be replaced with, or be reduced to the issue of distributive injustice
due to the theory of equality of opportunity. Remember that the Okishio—
Morishima theory of exploitation is contained within Roemer’s PR theory of
exploitation. Given this point, the Marxian theory of exploitation, as repre-
sented by the Okishio—Morishima formulation, is no longer per se the subject of
normatively primary concern. Rather, it is sufficient that we diagnose societies
using the theory of equal opportunity, which is the main message derived from
Roemer’s PR theory of exploitation in conjunction with the theory of equality
of opportunity.
3 Recent trends of exploitation theory in polit-
ical philosophy and sociology
This section introduces new trends in exploitation theory, mainly developed
in the fields of political philosophy and sociology. Here, the work of Vrousalis
(2013) provides a remarkable new development of exploitation theory in political
philosophy, while in sociology, the work of Wright (2000) has made a significant
contribution to the recent revival of exploitation theory.
3.1 A conceptual definition of Vrousalis (2013) in political
philosophy
Nicholas Vrousalis (2013) gives the following argument for the general concep-
tual definition of exploitation:
Definition 12 [Vrousalis (2013)]: An agent, ν, exploits an agent, μ, if and only
if ν and μ are embedded in a systematic relationship in which (a) ν instru-
mentalizes μ’s vulnerability to ν in order to (b) extract a net benefit from μ.
To make this definition understandable, we examine each concept in Definition
12 individually.
First, instrumentalization of a subject implies that the subject is being used
as a means to an end. Note that, according to Vrousalis (2013), neither un-
fairness nor intentionality of instrumentalization is necessary for the definition
of exploitation. Others, such as Roberto Goodin, define exploitation as un-
fairly taking advantage of another’s attributes. For example, one might take
advantage of a person’s honesty or blindness to steal from him/her. This would
constitute exploiting that person. However, as we will see, Vrousalis (2013) pro-
vides examples of the “non-unfair” utilization of others’ attributes, which is still
deemed to be exploitative. Vrousalis (2013) also discusses that one can unin-
tentionally or unknowingly instrumentalize another’s vulnerability, and thereby
exploit that person.
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Second, Vrousalis (2013) describes two types of vulnerability: absolute and
relational. An agent suffers absolute vulnerability when he/she is at substantial
risk of a significant loss in the relevant metric (welfare, resources, capabilities,
etc.). The absence of absolute vulnerability is guaranteed by security, which
implies such losses will not occur. However, absolute vulnerability does not refer
to an agent’s power over another person. In contrast, the notion of relational
vulnerability is defined as follows: μ is relationally vulnerable to ν if ν has some
sort of power over μ in that, (i) μ lacks something that he/she wants/needs, F ,
that is a requirement for μ to flourish; (ii) μ can only obtain F from ν; and (iii)
ν has it within his/her discretion to withhold F from μ.7
Given the above discussion, Vrousalis (2013) derives the notion of economic
vulnerability, defined as follows: μ is economically vulnerable to ν if and only
if μ is relationally vulnerable to ν by virtue of μ’s position relative to ν in the
relations of production. Here, the relations of production refers to systematic
relations of effective ownership, and therefore, of power over human labor power
and means of production in society. For instance, suppose that ν owns a water-
producing well and ν’s ownership is fully enforced. If μ needs water, but has no
independent access to water, then μ is economically vulnerable to ν. The impli-
cation of this notion in a capitalist economy is that μ is relationally vulnerable
to ν by virtue of ν’s ownership of a means of production and μ’s lack thereof
(or, μ’s ownership is substantially less than ν’s). This gives ν economic power
over μ, regardless of whether μ is forced by economic circumstances to supply
labor power to ν.
The definition of economic power over is as follows: ν has economic power
over μ if and only if ν has the relevant ability and opportunity to get μ to
do something by virtue of control over a greater share of resources than μ.
Therefore, if ων > ωμ, then ν has economic power over μ.
Summarizing the above arguments, we can derive the following logical im-
plication:
Proposition 1 [Vrousalis (2013)]: If ν instrumentalizes μ’s economic vulnera-
bility to ν, then in doing so, ν takes advantage of his/her economic power over
μ.
Here, under capitalism, if μ does not have any means of production but ν does,
or μ owns substantially less than ν, then μ is economically vulnerable to ν. This
is because ν is given economic power over μ and can get μ to supply his/her
labor power to ν. Indeed, assuming an equal distribution of internal resources,8
the wealth owned by capitalists (or agent ν) systematically gives them a decisive
bargaining advantage over workers (or agent μ). This means capitalists always
7Note, that Vrousalis (2013) does not consider condition (iii) of relational vulnerability to
be a necessary condition for exploitation, for there is nothing contradictory in the thought
that ν is forced to exploit μ, and therefore lacks the said discretion.
8 Internal resources imply talents and/or skills inherited in individuals. In contrast, any
other types of resources that are transferrable are often called external resources. For a more
detail argument on these concepts, see Cohen (1995).
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have an advantage of economic power over workers, but never the other way
around.
Given the above discussion, Vrousalis (2013) derives the notion of economic
exploitation by applying the general definition of exploitation in Definition 12
to economic problems, as follows:
Definition 13 [Vrousalis (2013)]: Agent ν economically exploits agent μ if and
only if ν and μ are embedded in a systematic relationship in which, (a) ν
instrumentalizes μ’s economic vulnerability to ν in order to (b) appropriate (the
fruits of) μ’s labor.
Here, condition (b) of Definition 13 needs clarification: ν appropriates μ’s labor
when μ toils for H hours, and ν appropriates a use-value of H−G hours of toil,
where G can be any number satisfying H > G = 0.
It is worth noting that, in Definition 13, an unequal exchange of labor (UEL)
is simply a necessary condition for economic exploitation. Unequal exchange
occurs when there is an unreciprocated net transfer of goods or labor time
from one party to another. According to Definition 13, condition (b) implies
an unequal exchange of (the fruits of) labor. Hence, the UEL is necessary for
economic exploitation. However, the UEL per se is not sufficient for economic
exploitation, as economic exploitation requires both conditions (a) and (b) of
Definition 13. For instance, gift-giving implies an unequal exchange, but no
one thinks of (even systematic) gift-giving as exploitative. If one party freely
decides to pass on a large part of whatever use-value he/she creates (with his/her
own labor power) to another party of society, the resulting inequality in the
consumption of (surplus) labor need not be objectionable.
3.2 A conceptual definition of exploitation byWright (2000)
in sociology
Eric Ohlin Wright (2000) defines exploitation as follows:
Definition 14 [Wright (2000)]: Exploitation exists if the following three criteria
are satisfied:
(1) The inverse interdependent welfare principle: The material welfare of ex-
ploiters causally depends upon the reduction of material welfare of the exploited;
(2) The exclusion principle: This inverse interdependence of the welfare of ex-
ploiters and the exploited depends upon the exclusion of the exploited from
access to certain productive resources;
(3) The appropriation principle: The exclusion generates a material advantage
to exploiters because it enables them to appropriate the labor effort of the
exploited.
In a market economy, both parties to an exchange gain relative to their con-
dition before making the exchange: both workers and capitalists gain when an
exchange of labor power for a wage occurs. Such mutual gains from trade can
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occur, but it can still be the case that the magnitude of the gain by one party
is at the expense of another party. Thus, criterion (1) should be satisfied and,
according to Wright (2000), we should not assume that market exchanges do
not satisfy (1) because of mutual gains from trade.
So far, Wright (2000) argues that exploitation is the process through which
certain inequalities in income are generated by inequalities in rights and pow-
ers over productive resources. Such inequalities in income occur through the
ways in which exploiters, by virtue of their exclusionary rights and powers over
productive resources, are able to appropriate the labor effort of the exploited.
Before closing this subsection, it is worth noting the following with regard to
Definition 14. I do not believe that Definition 14 is sufficient as a definition of
exploitation, nor is it as elaborate a conceptual configuration as Definition 13.
Definition 14 looks to simply list the indispensable principles of exploitation as
its essential features, although the three principles are intuitively appealing and
well acknowledged. Moreover, it is easy to check that Definition 13 satisfies all
three principles in Definition 14. Indeed, the appropriation principle is obviously
satisfied, and the exclusion principle is satisfied by the definition of economic
vulnerability. Finally, Definition 13 also satisfies the inverse interdependence
welfare principle as long as the fruit of labor is defined as a use-value contributing
to human welfare.
3.3 Relations of exploitation with forced transfers, eco-
nomic oppression, and distributive injustice
This subsection examines the logical relation of exploitation to similar notions of
economic oppression and/or distributive injustice using the conceptual definition
of exploitation developed by Vrousalis (2013) and Wright (2000).
3.3.1 Exploitation and forced transfer
First, we refer to the definitions of exploitation given by well-known Marxists,
such as Nancy Holmstrom, R. G. Peffer, and Jeffrey Reiman. According to their
arguments, agent ν exploits agent μ if and only if ν extracts forced, unpaid
surplus labor from μ. That is, according to their definitions, forced transfer of
(the fruit of) labor is an indispensable condition for exploitation. In contrast,
neither Definition 13 nor Definition 14 includes any condition related to forced
transfer.
Indeed, forced transfer does not constitute a sufficient condition for exploita-
tion. For instance, societies with welfare states generally provide for the sick
and disabled, among others. Those welfare beneficiaries receive a net transfer
of labor time from able-bodied tax payers. These able-bodied are also forced to
engage in these net transfers by the state. However, no one would say that the
disabled or the sick exploit the able-bodied.
Moreover, forced transfer is not necessary for exploitation. For instance,
assume that both agents ν and μ have the same welfare function with respect to
the consumption of coconuts, and ν is wealthier than μ in terms of the ownership
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of land. Then, ν’s land is more productive than μ’s land in terms of coconuts.
However, without any input of labor, both have access to g coconuts because
of the natural productivity of the palms in each of their lands. Suppose that
both agents can enjoy a decent level of welfare by consuming g coconuts. Now,
ν offers μ the option of working on ν’s land, which is much more productive
than μ’s land when he/she works on it by himself/herself. If they agree on the
contract of ν’s offer, this implies that μ will produce H coconuts and consumebg, where bg > g and is also sufficiently large to compensate for his/her disutility
of labor, if any. As a consequence, μ accepts this contract, and therefore ν
consumes H − bg (> bg) coconuts without working at all. This is an example of
economic exploitation, according to Definition 13, but μ is not being forced by
economic circumstances or by a third party to enter into this agreement. This
implies that forced transfer is not necessary for exploitation.
3.3.2 Exploitation and distributive injustice
Based on the notion of economic exploitation in Definition 13, Roemer’s claim
that the issue of exploitation can be reduced to that of distributive injustice
is not valid. To argue this point, Vrousalis (2013) introduces the notion of
cleanly generated capitalism; that is, “a form of capitalism that does not arise
from ‘primitive accumulation’ through massacre, plunder, forced extraction, or,
more generally, by transgressing some norm of distributive justice. Rather, it
arises from ‘clean’ social interactions: a laborer, or class of laborers, manages
to accumulate significant quantities of capital through toil and savings, thereby
turning himself/herself into a capitalist.”
In considering cleanly generated capitalism, Vrousalis (2013) provides us
with the following example:
Example of Grasshopper and Ant: Grasshopper spends the summer months
singing, whereas Ant spends all her time working. When the winter comes,
Grasshopper needs shelter, which he presently lacks. Ant has three options:
(i) she can do nothing to help Grasshopper, in which case, the corresponding
payoff allocation, (V ∗An, V ∗Gh) is (V ∗An, V ∗Gh) = (10, 1);
(ii) she can offer Grasshopper costless shelter on the condition that he signs
a sweatshop contract, in which case, the corresponding payoff allocation is
(V ∗An, V ∗Gh) = (12, 2);
(iii) she can offer Grasshopper her shelter, which costs her nothing, in which
case, the corresponding payoff allocation is (V ∗An, V ∗Gh) = (10, 3).
Now, it is plausible to think that Ant has an obligation to help Grasshopper.
However, one need not have a view on this to believe that (ii) is morally worse
than (iii), in part because the choice of (ii) constitutes exploitation. Indeed,
according to the Roemerian principle of voluntary disadvantages discussed in
the last section, (i), (ii), and (iii) are equally acceptable. This implies that, even
if it is agreed that the option (ii) involves exploitation, it cannot be condemned
as distributive injustice by means of Roemer’s theory of equality of opportunity.
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The above argument suggests that Roemer’s claim that exploitation implies
distributive injustice cannot be validated, as long as Definition 13 is presumed.
The reason why exploitation survives in the absence of distributive injustice is
that, in Definition 13, the notion of exploitation is to diagnose the structure of
an economic transaction involving an asymmetric power relation that system-
atically generates an unequal exchange of labor. In other words, exploitation
constitutes a procedural injury to status, which is not reducible to distributive
injury.
3.3.3 Exploitation and non-exploitative economic oppression
Exploitation is nothing but a category of economic oppression. Generally speak-
ing, economic oppression could be conceived of as social relations satisfying the
inverse interdependence welfare principle and the exclusion principle in Defini-
tion 14. According to Wright (2000), various forms of economic oppression can
be categorized into the following two notions: exploitation and non-exploitative
economic oppression.
In non-exploitative oppression, the advantaged group does not itself need the
excluded group. The welfare of the advantaged does depend on the exclusion
principle, but there is no ongoing interdependence between their activities and
those of the disadvantaged. However, in exploitation, exploiters depend upon
the effort of the exploited for their own welfare. Hence, exploiters depend upon
and need the exploited.
We can find a sharp contrast between these two notions by considering
the difference in the treatment of indigenous people in North America (non-
exploitative economic oppression) and South Africa (exploitation) by European
settlers. First, in both cases, we can find a causal relationship between the ma-
terial advantage to the settlers and the material disadvantage to the indigenous
people. This implies that both cases satisfy the inverse interdependence wel-
fare principle. Second, in both cases, this causal relation is rooted in processes
by which indigenous people were excluded from a crucial productive resource,
namely land. Hence, both cases satisfy the exclusion principle.
However, in South Africa, the settlers appropriated the fruits of labor of the
indigenous population, first as agricultural labor, and later as mine workers.
This implies that the relation between the settlers and the indigenous people in
South Africa is characterized as exploitative.
In contrast, in North America, the labor effort of the indigenous people was
generally not appropriated. The indigenous people were simply excluded from
capitalistic economic activities developed by the settlers. This implies that the
settlers in North America could adopt a strategy of genocide in response to the
conflict generated by this exclusion, because they did not need the labor effort
of Native Americans. Thus, the relation between the settlers and the indige-
nous people in North America is as an example of non-exploitative economic
oppression.
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3.4 Implications of exploitation theory à la Vrousalis (2013)-
Wright (2000) from the standpoint of economic theory
The Vrousalis (2013)—Wright (2000) theory of exploitation, unlike the Okishio—
Morishima theory, constitutes the notion of exploitation without relying on the
basic framework of the classical labor theory of value or the classical Marxian
theory of surplus value. However, it also treats the UEL as an indispensable
component of exploitation. In this respect, unlike the Roemer theory of PR-
exploitation, it inherits a traditional feature from the classical Marxian exploita-
tion theory.
As a result of their independence from the classical framework of the surplus
value theory, their arguments make it possible for us to infer exploitation even in
economies with no relationship of capital and labor. To see this point, we define
a model of Heckscher—Ohlin international economies with two nations and two
commodities. We then examine whether a free trade equilibrium between the
North and the South involves exploitation. Since the Heckscher-Ohlin model
does not have international factor markets, our question here is beyond the
traditional subject of the classical Marxian theory and the Okishio—Morishima
exploitation theory, which address the existence of exploitation in the production
process in terms of employment relations between capital and labor.
Following the notation used in section 2, assume N ≡ {Nh, Sh} and n = 2.
Let b ∈ R2++ be the subsistence consumption bundle, which every citizen in
every nation must consume for his/her survival in one period of production,
regardless of whether he/she supplies labor. For the sake of simplicity, each
nation has the same size population, normalized to unity. In addition, as in
section 2, the maximal labor supply of each agent is equal to unity and there is
no difference in labor skills (human capital) among agents. Let ω ∈ R2++ be the
world endowments of material capital goods at the beginning of the initial period
of production. For the sake of simplicity, assume ω ≡ A [I −A]−1 (Nb), where
N = 2 in this section. Every national economy has the common consumption
space, C ≡ ©c ∈ R2+ | c = bª× [0, 1] and the common welfare function, u : C →
R, defined as follows: for each (c, l) ∈ C,
u (c, l) = 1− l.
That is, no nation is concerned by an increase in consumption goods beyond
the subsistence level, b, but they evaluate their social welfare in terms of the
increase in free hours (leisure time), once b is guaranteed. An international
economy is thus defined by the profile hN , (A,L, b) ,ωi, which we call a subsistent
(international) economic environment.
In an economic model with two nations and two goods, the input coefficient
matrix, A, is given by:
A =
∙
a11 a12
a21 a22
¸
>
∙
0 0
0 0
¸
,
where 1−a11 > 0, 1−a22 > 0, and (1− a11) (1− a22) > 0. The labor coefficient
vector, L, is given by L = (L1, L2) > (0, 0). Denote each nation’s capital
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endowments in period t by ωNht =
¡ωNh1t ,ωNh2t ¢ > (0, 0) and ωSht = ¡ωSh1t ,ωSh2t ¢ >
(0, 0). In addition, assume that ωNh0 > ωSh0 .
In the following discussion, unlike in the neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin model
of international trade, we assume there are multiple types of capital goods, each
of which is reproducible by an overall economic system. In contrast, labor is a
primary productive factor in that it is not reproducible, and is indispensable as
a factor in any production activity.
We explicitly take the time structure of production. Hence, the capital
goods available in the present period of production cannot exceed the amount
of capital goods accumulated until the end of the preceding period of production.
Moreover, the time structure of production is given as follows:
(1) Given the market prices pt−1 = (p1t−1, p2t−1) ≥ (0, 0) at the beginning
of period t, each nation, ν = Nh, Sh, purchases, under the constraint of its
wealth endowment, pt−1ωνt , capital goods Axνt as inputs for the production in
the present period. Each nation also purchases the commodities δνt to sell, for
speculative purposes, at the end of the present period;
(2) Each nation is engaged in the production activity of the period t by in-
putting labor, Lxνt , and the purchased capital goods, Axνt ;
(3) The production activity is completed and xνt is produced as an output at
the end of this period. Then, in goods markets with market prices pt ≥ (0, 0),
each nation earns the revenue (ptxνt + ptδνt ) derived from the output xνt , as
well as the speculative commodity bundle δνt . The nation uses the revenue to
purchase the bundle b for consumption at the end of this period and the capital
stock ωνt+1 for production in the next period. Therefore, the wealth endowment
carried over to the next period, t+ 1, is ptωνt+1.
A model of international trade endowed with the above-mentioned time struc-
ture is called a Marxian Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade.
Let (wνt , rνt ) be the profile of prices in the domestic factor markets of nationν in period t. That is, this is the profile of the wage rate and interest rate in ν’s
domestic markets. Given a price system,
­{pt−1, pt} ; (wνt , rνt )ν∈N
®
, in period t,
each nation, ν (= Nh, Sh), solves the following optimization program:
min
xνt ,δνt
lνt
s.t. ptxνt + ptδνt = ptb+ ptωνt+1;
ptx
ν
t − pt−1Axνt = wνt Lxνt + rνt pt−1Axνt ;
lνt = Lxνt 5 1;
pt−1δνt + pt−1Axνt 5 pt−1ωνt , where δνt ∈ R2+ ;
ptωνt+1 = pt−1ωνt .
We denote the set of solutions to the optimization program of each nation, ν,
in period t by Oνt
¡{pt−1, pt} ; (wνt , rνt )ν∈N ¢.
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For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the case of stationary equilibrium
prices (i.e., pt = pt−1 = p∗). In this case, for any optimal solution, (x∗νt , δ∗νt ) ∈
Oνt
¡
p∗; (wν∗t , rν∗t )ν∈N
¢
, it follows that p∗x∗νt − p∗Ax∗νt = p∗b.
Definition 15: For a subsistence international economy,
­N , (A,L, b) , ¡ωNh0 ,ωSh0 ¢®,
where ωNh0 + ωSh0 = ω, an international reproducible solution (IRS) is a profile
of a price system
­
p∗; (wν∗t , rν∗t )ν∈N
®
and production activities (x∗νt )ν∈N (∀t)
that satisfies the following conditions:
(i) (x∗νt , δ∗νt ) ∈ Oνt
¡
p∗; (wν∗t , rν∗t )ν∈N
¢
(∀t) (each nation’s welfare optimization);
(ii) 2b 5 [I −A] ¡x∗Nht + x∗Sht ¢ (∀t) (the demand-supply matching at the end
of each period);
(iii) A
¡
x∗Nht + x∗Sht
¢
+
³
δ∗Nht + δ∗Sht
´
5 ωNht + ωSht (∀t) (the social feasibility
of production at the beginning of each period).
In addition to the above definition, we focus on the following subset of the IRS:
An international reproducible solution is imperfectly specialized if and only if
x∗νt ∈ R2++ and δ∗νt = 0 (∀t), for each ν ∈ N . By the property of imperfect
specialization of the IRS, it follows that p∗ ∈ R2++ and [I −A]
¡
x∗Nht + x∗Sht
¢
=
2b. The latter equation implies
¡
x∗Nht + x∗Sht
¢
= [I −A]−1 (2b). Therefore,
A
¡
x∗Nht + x∗Sht
¢
= A [I −A]−1 (2b) = ω = ωNh0 + ωSh0 holds.
It is well known that, in the so-called neoclassical Heckscher—Ohlin model
of international trade, the factor price equalization theorem and the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem hold. Even in the Marxian Heckscher-Ohlin model of interna-
tional trade presented here, we can verify the factor price equalization theorem,
as follows:
Theorem 1 (Factor price equalization theorem in subsistence economies):
For any subsistence international economy,
­N , (A,L, b) , ¡ωNh0 ,ωSh0 ¢®, with ωNh0 +
ωSh0 = ω, let
­
p∗; (wν∗t , rν∗t )ν∈N , (x∗νt )ν∈N
®
be an imperfectly specialized IRS.
Then, if p
∗Ae1
L1
6= p∗Ae2L2 , where ei is the i-th unit vector (only the i-th component
is unity, and any other is zero), then
¡
wNh∗t , rNh∗t
¢
=
¡
wSh∗t , rSh∗t
¢
holds.
Proof. By the property of an imperfectly specialized IRS, the following equation
holds for each nation, ν = Nh, Sh:
p∗ [I −A] = rν∗t p∗A+ wν∗t L. (2.1)
Let H ≡ A [I −A]−1 and v ≡ L [I −A]−1. Then, by (2.1), we have:
p∗ = rν∗t p∗H + wν∗t v.
Note that by the indecomposability of matrix A and the hypothesis of the
Hawkins—Simon condition, [I −A]−1 is a positive matrix. This implies that
H is also a positive matrix and v is a positive vector. Therefore:¡
rNh∗t − rSh∗t
¢
p∗H +
¡
wNh∗t − wSh∗t
¢
v = 0.
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To establish
¡
wNh∗t , rNh∗t
¢
=
¡
wSh∗t , rSh∗t
¢
, it is sufficient to confirm that
the row vectors p∗H and v are linearly independent. By p
∗Ae1
L1
6= p∗Ae2L2 , it
follows that p∗Ae1 · L2 − p∗Ae2 · L1 6= 0, which implies the matrix
∙
p∗A
L
¸
is non-singular, and therefore the row vector p∗A and the row vector L are
linearly independent. Now, assume that the row vectors p∗H and v are linearly
dependent. Then, there exists a positive scalar, ς > 0, such that ςp∗H = v.
Multiplying both sides of this equation by [I −A], from the right, we obtain
ςp∗A = L, which contradicts the fact that p∗A and L are linearly independent.
Thus, p∗H and v are linearly independent.
Theorem 2 (“Quasi-Heckscher—Ohlin theorem” in subsistence economies):
For any subsistence international economy,
­N , (A,L, b) , ¡ωNh0 ,ωSh0 ¢®, with ωNh0 +
ωSh0 = ω, let
­
p∗; (w∗t , r∗t ) , (x∗νt )ν∈N
®
be an imperfectly specialized IRS with
p∗Ae1
L1
> p
∗Ae2
L2
. Then, if p∗ωNht > p∗ωSht , the wealthier nation, Nh, exports
the more capital-intensive good, good 1, and imports the more labor-intensive
good, good 2. Correspondingly, the poorer nation, Sh, exports the more labor-
intensive good, good 2, and imports the more capital-intensive good, good 1.
Proof. Firstly, we show that, in equilibrium, it follows that:
p∗Ae1
p∗Ae2
>
p∗ [I −A] e1
p∗ [I −A] e2 =
L1
L2
.
Assume that p
∗Ae1
p∗Ae2
5 p
∗[I−A]e1
p∗[I−A]e2 . Then, since
p∗Ae1
p∗Ae2
> L1L2 , both nations have the
optimal solution:
x∗νt =
µ
min
½
p∗b
p∗ [I −A] e1 ,
p∗ωνt
p∗Ae1
¾
, 0
¶
.
This implies that (x∗νt )ν∈N violates condition (ii) of Definition 15, which is a
contradiction. Likewise, if we assume that p
∗[I−A]e1
p∗[I−A]e2 <
L1
L2
, then both nations
have the optimal solutions:
x∗νt =
µ
0,min
½
p∗b
p∗ [I −A] e2 ,
p∗ωνt
p∗Ae2
¾¶
,
which again violates condition (ii) of Definition 15, producing a contradiction.
In summary, we must have p
∗Ae1
p∗Ae2
> p
∗[I−A]e1
p∗[I−A]e2 =
L1
L2
in equilibrium.
In this case, the optimal production activity, x∗νt , of each nation, ν, has the
properties p∗b = p∗ [I −A]x∗νt and p∗Ax∗νt = p∗ωνt . Moreover, by condition (ii)
of Definition 15, we have [I −A]−1 b = 12
¡
x∗Nht + x∗Sht
¢
. Then, since p∗ωNht >
p∗ωSht , we have x∗Nh1 > e1 [I −A]−1 b > x∗Sh1 and x∗Nh2 < e2 [I −A]−1 b <
x∗Sh2 , which implies that
(1− a11)x∗Nh1 − a12x∗Nh2 > b1 > (1− a11)x∗Sh1 − a12x∗Sh2 ;
(1− a22)x∗Nh2 − a21x∗Nh1 < b2 < (1− a22)x∗Sh2 − a21x∗Sh1 .
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That implies that nation Nh exports good 1 and imports good 2, whereas nation
Sh imports good 1 and exports good 2. Since p
∗Ae1
L1
> p
∗Ae2
L2
, we can say that
good 1 is more capital-intensive and good 2 is more labor-intensive.
Note that, unlike the standard Heckscher—Ohlin theorem derived from the neo-
classical Heckscher—Ohlin model, Theorem 2 is not necessary to explain the
mechanism of free trade as the principle of comparative advantage. The good 1
industry is, in the present equilibrium, incidentally more capital intensive than
the good 2 industry. This allows the possibility that, in a transient price system
before arriving at the equilibrium, the good 2 industry would be more capital
intensive than the good 1 industry. Likewise, nation Nh is incidentally wealthier
than nation Sh in the present equilibrium price system, which allows the pos-
sibility that, in a transient price system before arriving at the equilibrium, the
monetary value of Sh’s capital endowments is larger than that of Nh. Therefore,
it is difficult to preserve the implication of the standard Heckscher—Ohlin the-
orem, which states that a free trade equilibrium is established in international
markets through the mechanism of international division of labor. In other
words, each nation chooses its own production activity, following the principle
of comparative advantage, to specialize in the industry that uses this nation’s
relatively abundant factor of production more intensively. In this way, a free
trade equilibrium is established, according to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin the-
orem.
The notion of labor exploitation under subsistence economies is formally
defined as follows:
Definition 16: For any subsistence economy, hN , (A,L, b) ,ωi, let ­p∗; (wν∗t , rν∗t )ν∈N , (x∗νt )ν∈N
®
be an IRS. Then, the amount of socially necessary labor required to produce b
as a net output is:
1
2
L
¡
x∗Nh + x∗Sh
¢
= vb = L [I −A]−1 b.
Moreover, for each nation, ν = Nh, Sh, the supply of labor hours to earn revenue
p∗b for its own survival is Lx∗ν , which implies:
ν is an exploiting nation⇐⇒ Lx∗ν < vb;
ν is an exploited nation⇐⇒ Lx∗ν > vb.
Under the assumption of Definition 16, the following theorem indicates that
if the quasi-Hecksher—Ohlin international division of labor is generated in the
international relation between the North and South, it is characterized as an
exploitative relation:
Theorem 3 (The generation of exploitative relations in subsistence
economies): For any subsistence international economy,
­N , (A,L, b) , ¡ωNh0 ,ωSh0 ¢®,
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with ωNh0 + ωSh0 = ω, let
­
p∗; (w∗t , r∗t ) , (x∗νt )ν∈N
®
be an imperfectly specialized
IRS with p
∗Ae1
L1
> p
∗Ae2
L2
. Then, if r∗t > 0 and p∗ωNht > p∗ωSht , then the wealth-
ier nation, Nh, is exploiting, and the poorer nation, Sh, is exploited, in terms
of Definition 16. Conversely, if r∗t = 0 or p∗ωNht = p∗ωSht holds, then there is
no exploitative relation.
Proof. Following the proof of Theorem 2, we can confirm that at the IRS, the
optimal production activity, x∗νt , for each nation, ν, is selected to satisfy p∗b =
p∗ [I −A]x∗νt and p∗Ax∗νt = p∗ωνt . Then, by p∗ωNht > p∗ωSht , the hyperplane
p∗Ax∗Nht = p∗ωNht is placed above the hyperplane p∗Ax∗Sht = p∗ωSht . Moreover,
by p∗ [I −A]x∗Nht = p∗b = p∗ [I −A]x∗Sht , the point x∗Nht is placed more to
the right than point x∗Sht . Recall that the condition
p∗Ae1
p∗Ae2
>
p∗ [I −A] e1
p∗ [I −A] e2 =
L1
L2
holds in equilibrium, with p∗ωNht > p∗ωSht , which implies that the normal vec-
tor, L, has a gentler slope than the normal vector p∗ [I −A], or that the slopes
of both normal vectors are identical. Therefore, since the point x∗Nht is placed
more to the right than point x∗Sht ,
p∗[I−A]e1
p∗[I−A]e2 >
L1
L2
implies
Lx∗Nht < L [I −A]−1 b < Lx∗Sht .
In contrast, p
∗[I−A]e1
p∗[I−A]e2 =
L1
L2
implies
Lx∗Nht = L [I −A]−1 b = Lx∗Sht .
Note that the property p
∗[I−A]e1
p∗[I−A]e2 >
L1
L2
is confirmed as follows: first, by
p∗ = r∗t p∗H + w∗t v, if r∗t > 0, then
p∗
w∗t
> v ⇔ p
∗
w∗t
[I −A] > L.
If there exists a positive number, ς > 1, such that p∗w∗t [I −A] = ςL holds, then
p∗
w∗t
= ςv holds. However, according to the proof of Theorem 1, the linear inde-
pendence of the vectors p∗H and v is confirmed by p
∗Ae1
L1
> p
∗Ae2
L2
. Therefore,
there is no positive number ς > 1 such that p∗w∗t = ςv. Thus, there is no ς > 1
such that p
∗
w∗t
[I −A] = ςL. In summary, we have p∗w∗t [I −A] > L since r∗t > 0,
and p
∗[I−A]e1
p∗[I−A]e2 =
L1
L2
holds by the property of an imperfectly specialization equi-
librium, both of which imply p
∗[I−A]e1
p∗[I−A]e2 >
L1
L2
.
In contrast, if r∗t = 0, then
p∗
w∗t
= v ⇔ p∗ [I −A] = w∗tL,
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which corresponds to the case of p
∗[I−A]e1
p∗[I−A]e2 =
L1
L2
.
In Theorem 3, the inequality Lx∗Nht < vb < Lx∗Sht that represents the
unequal exchange of labor implies the generation of exploitative relation. In an
IRS for a subsistence economic environment, both Nh and Sh earn the minimal
income required to purchase the subsistence bundle, b. However, there is a
difference between the two nations in terms of their labor supply, which means
nation Nh enjoy more hours of freedom from the necessary labor for survival
than does nation Sh. Based on Definition 13, this phenomenon is not simply an
issue of wealth inequality, but implies the existence of an exploitative relation.
Firstly, nation Sh is economically vulnerable to nation Nh. This is be-
cause nation Nh has sufficient wealth, p∗ωNht , that it can survive autarkically,
but Sh cannot do so given its level of wealth, p∗ωSht , evaluated at the present
international market equilibrium prices. Therefore, the survival of nation Sh
can be guaranteed trading with Nh. In other words, given the present equilib-
rium price system, though Nh can withdraw from the trade relation with Sh at
the expense of its economic rationality, it is substantially impossible for Sh to
withdraw from the trade relation with Nh.
Secondly, Nh can instrumentalize the economic vulnerability of Sh, which
gives Nh a bargaining advantage over Sh in their trade relation. As a conse-
quence, the trade relation between Nh and Sh is characterized by the systematic
feature that Sh cannot but accept the appropriation of the fruits of its labor by
Nh. This is the structure of the trade relation between Nh and Sh generated
systematically in the imperfectly specialized IRS.
This phenomenon obviously implies that the inverse interdependent welfare
principle of Definition 14 is satisfied. Moreover, this inverse interdependency
occurs because Sh does not have sufficient access to capital goods because of a
lack of wealth. This implies that the exclusion principle of Definition 14 is also
satisfied. Indeed, if Sh were to own sufficient wealth that it was able to purchase
the capital goods, A [I −A]−1 b, necessary for its autarkic survival, then Nh
could not appropriate the fruit of the labor of Sh, Lx∗Sht − L [I −A]−1 b.
Finally, forNh to enjoy more free hours depends heavily on the trade relation
with Sh. Indeed, without the trade with Sh, Nh should invest L [I −A]−1 b
of labor, even if it owns ωNht > A [I −A]−1 b. As a result of the trade relation
with Sh, in which the mutual gains from trade exist, Nh can guarantee its
own survival by appropriating the fruit of labor from Sh, Lx∗Sht −L [I −A]−1 b,
even with fewer labor hours than L [I −A]−1 b. Thus, the inequality of the
UEL, Lx∗Nht < vb < Lx∗Sht , also implies an exploitative relation, even in terms
of Definition 14.
Note that the neoclassical international trade theory is ignorant of the gener-
ation of exploitation in free trade equilibria, since it usually evaluates the perfor-
mance of the free trade in terms of the mutual gains from trade. Here, free trade
is praised for its mechanism that enables both parties to increase their welfare
from their autarkic activities. Furthermore, according to this theory, another
virtue of free trade is that South’s gain from the trade is typically greater than
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that of North. These features are also found in the imperfectly specialized IRS
of Marxian Heckscher—Ohlin international trade. Therefore, the mutual gains
from trade and the generation of exploitative relations are completely compati-
ble in a free trade equilibrium under the Marxian Heckscher—Ohlin framework.
This is because the viewpoint of the mutual gains from trade is not concerned
about the asymmetric structure of the initial endowments or the corresponding
asymmetric power relations, both of which are primary concerns of the Vrousalis
(2013)—Wright (2000) viewpoint of exploitation.
4 Recent developments of exploitation theory
in economics: an axiomatic approach to ex-
ploitation theory
According to the Vrousalis (2013)—Wright (2000) theory, exploitation should be
conceptualized as the systematic structure of economic transactions character-
ized by the UEL. Here, part of the fruits of the labor of the exploited agents is
appropriated by the exploiters under the institutional framework of asymmet-
ric power relations resulting from private ownership. In contrast, the formal
definition of exploitation in economic theory has been discussed mainly as the
formulation of the UEL feature of exploitation.
The issue of how to formally define the UEL is not difficult to fix, as long
as we assume the simple Leontief types of production economies. For instance,
the formulation given by Definition 16 would be the unique, proper definition of
the UEL whenever the economies are restricted to subsistence economies with
a Leontief production technology. However, once we extend our perspective
beyond the simple Leontief production economies to more general economic en-
vironments, it becomes more difficult to formally define the UEL. Many proper
formal definitions of exploitation as the UEL have been proposed, such as those
of Morishima (1974), Roemer (1982; chapter 5), Foley (1982), and so on. These
proposals are essentially equivalent within the class of simple Leontief produc-
tion economies, but behave differently whenever the class of economies is ex-
tended to contain a more general type of economic model.
Note that if a definition of exploitation as the UEL is appropriate, it should
point out the existence of a transfer mechanism by which the UEL is medi-
ated: the UEL is implemented by a mechanism that transfers (a part of) the
productive fruits from the exploited to the exploiter. In perfectly competitive
markets, where neglecting the issue of rent, net outputs are distributed into two
categories of income: wage income and profit income. Moreover, every party
receives an equal wage per unit of (effective) labor. Therefore, the appropriation
of more of the productive fruits by exploiters must be explained by a source of
income other than wages, which implies the necessity of profit income. In other
words, a valid formal definition of exploitation as the UEL should be able to
verify the correspondence between the UEL and profits.
Summarizing the above argument leads to the following logical implication
27
as our desideratum:
(a) the formal definition of exploitation as the UEL is valid ⇒ (b) in any eco-
nomic equilibrium, the generation of positive profits must be equivalent to the
state that at least each of propertyless worker is exploited, according to the
presumed definition of exploitation.
Statement (b) is referred to as the Profit-Exploitation Correspondence
Principle (PECP).
The PECP looks similar to the FMT, but they are both conceptually and
formally different. Conceptually, the FMT, in general, refers to the (average)
rate of exploitation (= the rate of surplus value) for the working class as a
whole. Therefore, the FMT would be unsatisfactory if we are interested in each
individual worker’s exploitation status in an economy with heterogeneity and
diversity of individual agents.9 In contrast, the PECP requires the equivalence
between the generation of positive profits and the situation in which each prop-
ertyless worker is identified as exploited, even if the economic environments
have heterogenous and diverse agents and a more general production technol-
ogy. However, formally speaking, this does not necessarily imply that the PECP
is a stronger condition than the FMT. Indeed, as discussed in detail later, the
PECP and FMT are logically independent in that the former allows for zero
profits in conjunction with a positive average rate of exploitation, which would
violate the FMT.
Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a) axiomatically characterize the definitions
of exploitation that satisfy the PECP, and so shed new light on the debate
about the proper definition of exploitation in Marxian economics. Firstly, they
propose a general model of capitalist economies that allows for heterogeneity
in each agent’s preferences for consumption goods and leisure, heterogeneity in
their endowments of material and human capital, and a general closed-convex
cone type of production set. Secondly, given such a general model, they ax-
iomatically characterize the formulations of exploitation as the UEL in which
the PECP is preserved in any equilibrium. As a result, most definitions of ex-
ploitation proposed in the literature, such as those of Morishima (1974) and
Roemer (1982; chapter 5) do not preserve the PECP, with only the definition
à la New Interpretation [Duménil (1980), Foley (1982)] doing so. In addition,
Yoshihara and Veneziani (2013c) define exploitation in terms of a general com-
modity analogically to the New Interpretation definition of labor exploitation.
They then show that, given such a definition, the equivalence between positive
profits and the existence of exploitation in terms of a general commodity is not
established.
9For instance, as shown by Yoshihara and Veneziani (2012), in a von Neumann economy
with heterogeneity of propertyless workers’ welfare functions, the positivity of the average rate
of exploitation coexists with the non-exploitation of some propertyless workers, simply because
of their consumption choices. This implies that, even if the FMT holds in such economies, it
may be that some propertyless workers are not exploited.
28
In the following subsections, we introduce the main arguments developed by
Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a) by restricting our focus to the von Neumann
production technology, (A,B,L), introduced in section 2.
4.1 Model
We define a production possibility set derived from a von Neumann production
technology, (A,B,L), as follows:
P(A,B,L) ≡ ©α ≡ (−αl,−α,α) ∈ R− ×Rn− ×Rn+ | ∃x ∈ Rm+ : α 5 (−Lx,−Ax,Bx)ª .
Here, by the definition of α ∈ P(A,B,L), let bα ≡ α − α represent the vector of
net outputs corresponding to α. Given P(A,B,L), we define the set of production
activities feasible with k units of labor inputs by:
P(A,B,L) (αl = k) ≡ ©(−α0l,−α0,α0) ∈ P(A,B,L) | α0l = kª .
The frontier of the production possibility set P(A,B,L) is given by:
∂P(A,B,L) ≡ ©α ∈ P(A,B,L) | @α0 ∈ P(A,B,L) : α0 > αª .
Moreover, for any bundle c ∈ Rn+ , the production possibility set to produce c
as a net output is given by:
φ (c) ≡ ©α ∈ P(A,B,L) | bα = cª .
To characterize the types of agents in the von Neumann capitalist economies
defined in section 2, we assume in this section that each agent can be hetero-
geneous in terms of their capital endowments (ων0)ν∈N , welfare functions, and
labor skills. That is, for each ν ∈ N , sν > 0 represents his/her skill level.
Moreover, let C ⊆ Rn+ × [0, 1] be the consumption space common to all agents,
and for each ν ∈ N , let uν : C → R+ be his/her welfare function. All available
welfare functions are assumed to be increasing in consumption bundles and de-
creasing in the supply of labor hours. Thus, one capitalist economy is defined
by the list E ≡ ­N ;P(A,B,L); (uν , sν ,ων0)ν∈N
®
.
Assuming the same time structure of production as in section 3.4, and given
a price system h{pt−1, pt} , wti in period t, each agent ν ∈ N engages in an op-
timal choice of production plan ανt ∈ P(A,B,L). Here, each agent, (i) purchases
a bundle of capital goods ανt under his/her wealth constraint, pt−1ωνt , and em-
ploys labor power, ανlt, at the beginning of this period; (ii) purchases an optimal
amount of commodity bundle δνt under budget constraint pt−1 (ωνt − ανt ) for
speculative purposes, to be sold at the end of the period; and (iii) chooses an
optimal labor supply and consumption plan, (cνt , lνt ) ∈ C, where cνt will be pur-
chased at the end of this period under the budget constraint of his/her revenue
from both production and speculation. This choice behavior is determined as a
solution to the optimization problem (MP νt ), as follows:
MP νt : max
(cνt ,l
ν
t )∈C; δνt∈Rn+ ; ανt∈P(A,B,L)
uν (cνt , lνt )
29
s.t. [ptανt − wtανlt] + wtΛνt + ptδνt = ptcνt + ptωνt+1, where Λνt ≡ sν lνt ;
pt−1δνt + pt−1ανt 5 pt−1ωνt ;
ptωνt+1 = pt−1ωνt .
Then, denote the set of solutions to the problem (MP νt ) by Oνt ({pt−1, pt} , wt).
As in section 3.4, we focus on the stationary equilibrium price vector, p∗ =
pt−1 = pt (∀t). Moreover, we focus on the non-trivial equilibrium satisfying
maxα0∈P(A,B,L)
p∗α0−p∗α0−wtα0l
p∗α0 = 0. In this case, by the monotone increasing
characteristic of uν at cνt , there always exists an optimal solution having δνt =
0. By focusing on this optimal solution, we can remove the description of δνt
without loss of generality. Henceforth, we consider the following equilibrium
notion:
Definition 17: For a capitalist economy, E , a reproducible solution (RS) is a
profile
¡
(p∗, w∗t ) ; ((c∗νt , l∗νt ) ;α∗νt )ν∈N
¢
of a price system and economic activities
in each period, t, satisfying the following conditions:
(i) ((c∗νt , l∗νt ) ;α∗νt ) ∈ Oνt (p∗, w∗t ) (∀t) (each agent’s optimization);
(ii)
P
ν∈N bα∗νt = Pν∈N c∗νt (∀t) (demand-supply matching at the end of each
period);
(iii)
P
ν∈N α∗νlt =
P
ν∈N Λ∗νt (∀t) (the labor market equilibrium);
(iv)
P
ν∈N α∗νt 5
P
ν∈N ωνt (∀t) (social feasibility of production at the beginning
of each period).
In the following section, we assume the stationary state on economic activi-
ties of agents and delete the time description, t.
4.2 Alternative definitions of exploitation and the domain
axiom of admissible definitions of exploitation
Recall that the model of capitalist economies considered in section 2 assumes
there is no difference in agents’ labor skills or consumption preferences. In
this section, we assume a more general model of a capitalist economy, E =­N ;P(A,B,L); (uν , sν ,ων0)ν∈N
®
, that includes heterogeneity of labor skills and
preferences. Here, discuss an axiom proposed by Veneziani and Yoshihara
(2013a), which represents the minimal necessary condition for admissible defini-
tions of exploitation as the UEL. Then, we introduce some alternative definitions
of exploitation proposed in the literature on mathematical Marxian economics.
Any definition of exploitation should be able to identify, associated with each
equilibrium allocation, the set of exploiting agents, N ter ⊆ N , and the set of
exploited agents, N ted ⊆ N , such that N ter ∩ N ted = ∅ holds. Moreover, it
should capture the feature of the UEL as the difference between the amount
of labor supplied by each agent and the amount of labor “received” via each
agent’s income. In particular, it should have the form that the supplied labor
amount is greater than the received labor amount for each exploited agent. Such
properties should be preserved as a core feature of exploitation, regardless of
the way in which exploitation as the UEL is defined.
30
Note that, for capitalist economies considered herein, each agent’s supply of
labor is identified by Λν . In contrast, what remains open to debate is how to
formulate the labor amount that each agent can “receive” via his/her earned
income. According to the forms of the “received” labor, there are a number of
possible definitions of exploitation.
Summarizing the above arguments, Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a) propose
an axiom that represents the minimal necessary condition for any definition of
exploitation, whenever it is deemed admissible as the form of the UEL:
Labor Exploitation (LE) [Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a)]: Given any defin-
ition of exploitation, for any capitalist economy E and any RS ¡(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N ¢,
the set of exploited agents, N ted ⊆ N , should have the following property: there
exists a profile of consumption bundles, (cνe )ν∈W ∈ RnW+ , such that, for any
ν ∈ W, pcνe = wΛν holds, and for some production point, αcνe ∈ φ (cνe) ∩ ∂P
with bαcνe ≯ cνe :
ν ∈ N ted ⇔ αcνel < Λν .
That is, axiom LE requires that any admissible definition of exploitation
must identify whether each propertyless agent is exploited for each reproducible
solution under any economy. More specifically, the axiom stipulates that the
set of propertyless exploited agents be identified as follows: according to each
specific admissible definition, there should be a profile, (cνe)ν∈W , for each prop-
ertyless agent’s consumption bundle affordable by that agent’s revenue, and its
corresponding profile
¡αcνe ¢ν∈W of production activities, where each αcνe can
produce the corresponding consumption bundle cνe as a net output in a techno-
logically efficient way. Then, the exploitation status of each propertyless agent
can be identified by comparing the amount of his/her labor supply Λν to the
amount of labor input αcνel that he/she is able to “receive” via his/her income
wΛν .
Axiom LE is a rather weak condition in that it only refers to the exploita-
tion status of propertyless agents in each reproducible solution. This should
be reasonable as a minimal necessary condition for the admissible domain. In
other words, a definition of exploitation is not necessarily deemed proper, even
if it satisfies LE. In fact, there are potentially infinitely many definitions of
exploitation that satisfy LE, and all the main definitions proposed in mathe-
matical Marxian economics literature satisfy this axiom.10
The following three definitions all satisfy LE. Note that, in the following
definitions, the labor value of any commodity c ∈ Rn+ given in Definition 4 is
represented by l.v. (c) ≡ min {αl | α = (−αl,−α,α) ∈ φ (c)}. Then, Definition
18 is a natural extension of the Morishima’s (1974) own definition of economies
with homogeneous agents to economies with possibly heterogeneous agents:
10Of course, this does not imply that the axiom LE is trivial. For instance, the definition
proposed by Matsuo (2008) does not satisfy LE.
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Definition 18 [Morishima (1974)]: For any capitalist economy, E , and any
ν ∈ W, who supplies Λν and consumes cν ∈ Rn+ , ν ∈ N ted if and only ifΛν > l.v. (cν ).
Then, we can naturally extend the Roemer (1982; chapter 5) definition of ex-
ploitation, given for economies with homogeneous agents, to economies with pos-
sibly heterogeneous agents, which also satisfies LE. For any price system (p,w) ∈
Rn+1+ and any c ∈ Rn+ , let φ (c; p,w) ≡
n
α ∈ argmaxα0∈P(A,B,L) pα
0−wα0l
pα0 | bα = co
and
l.v. (c; p,w) ≡ min {αl | α = (−αl,−α,α) ∈ φ (c; p,w)} .
Then:
Definition 19 [Roemer (1982; chapter 5)]: For any capitalist economy, E, any
RS,
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
, and any ν ∈W, who supplies Λν and consumes
cν ∈ Rn+ , ν ∈ N ted if and only if Λν > l.v. (cν ; p,w).
Finally, for any capitalist economy, E , and any RS, ¡(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N ¢,
let αp,w ≡Pν∈N αν . Moreover, for any c ∈ Rn+ , we define a non-negative num-
ber, τ c ∈ R+ , as satisfying τ cpbαp,w = pc. Then:
Definition 20 [Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a)]: For any capitalist economy,
E , any RS, ¡(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N ¢, and any ν ∈ W, who supplies Λν and
consumes cν ∈ Rn+ , ν ∈ N ted if and only if Λν > τ cναp,wl .
Definition 20 is also an extension of the New Interpretation definition of ex-
ploitation à la Duménil (1980)—Foley (1982), which was originally defined in
Leontief economies with homogeneous agents, then extended to economies with
possibly heterogeneous agents.
4.3 Profit-Exploitation Correspondence Principle
Now, we are ready to formulate Profit-Exploitation Correspondence Principle,
given as follows:
Profit-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (PECP) [Veneziani and
Yoshihara (2013a)]: For any capitalist economy, E , and any RS, ¡(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N ¢:£
pbαp,w − wαp,wl > 0⇔ N ted ⊇W+¤ ,
where W+ ≡ {ν ∈W | Λν > 0} 6= ∅.
That is, whatever the definition of exploitation, it must follow that for any
capitalist economy and any reproducible solution, total profits are positive if
and only if any propertyless employee is exploited in terms of this definition,
assuming the definition of exploitation is deemed appropriate. This is required
by PECP.
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Note that for the available class of capitalist economies considered here, there
is no requirement of a restriction that excludes the existence of fixed capital
goods, the possibility of joint production, or of technical changes. In addition,
unlike in condition (2) of the RFMT discussed in section 2, there is no restric-
tion that excludes the existence of inferior production processes. Moreover, the
heterogeneity of agents’ preferences and skills is also available. The equilibrium
notion presumed here is also sufficiently general that there is no requirement of a
subsistence wage condition. Therefore, the correspondence between profits and
exploitation is required for a large class of economic environments, as assumed
by the standard general equilibrium theory.
However, PECP per se is not so strong. Indeed, PECP even allows for
a situation in which some propertyless employees are exploited in equilibrium,
with zero total profit.11 This implies that, at least within the class of economies
with homogeneous agents, PECP is logically weaker than the statement of
the FMT. For, within the class of such economies, the FMT implies that no
propertyless employee is exploited in any equilibrium with zero profit.
As noted at the start of this section, we can derive the following lesson from
the recent developments in exploitation theory in political philosophy and sociol-
ogy: if a definition of exploitation satisfying axiom LE is proper, it must satisfy
PECP. Based on this perspective, Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a) studied the
necessary and sufficient condition for PECP, as stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 4 [Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a)]: For any definition of exploita-
tion satisfying LE, the following two statements are equivalent for any capitalist
economy, E , and any RS, ¡(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N ¢:
(1) PECP holds under this definition of exploitation;
(2) If pbαp,w−wαp,wl > 0, then for any ν ∈W+, there exists a production activityανπ ∈ P (αl = Λν) ∩ ∂P such that bανπ ∈ Rn+, pbανπ > wΛν , and (ανπl,ανπ,ανπ) =
ην
³
αcνel ,αcνe ,αcνe
´
hold for some ην > 1.
That is, condition (2) of Theorem 4 is the necessary and sufficient condition for
any definition of exploitation satisfying LE to preserve PECP. Condition (2)
states that, if total profits are positive in the present equilibrium, then for each
propertyless employee, ν ∈W+, there exists a suitable efficient production point,
ανπ, activated by the present amount of labor supply, Λν , which in conjunction
with production activity, αcνe , can verify that this agent is being exploited.
Recall that, according to axiom LE, production activity αcνe is identified by
the presumed definition of exploitation, and the corresponding labor input αcνel
represents agent ν’s “received” labor. Production activity ανπ ∈ P (αl = Λν) ∩∂P is defined as the proportional expansion of production point αcνe up to the
point of his/her present labor supply, Λν , and that produces a non-negative net
output, bανπ ∈ Rn+, that is non-affordable by ν at the present equilibrium because
pbανπ > wΛν . Therefore, since Λν = ανπl > αcνel holds for such a selection of ανπ,
11However, any definition of exploitation satisfying LE does not allow the existence of
exploited propertyless employees in conjunction with zero profit.
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we can confirm that agent ν ∈ W+ is exploited at this RS, according to the
given definition satisfying LE.
Theorem 4 does not provide a normative characterization of the presumed
definition of exploitation, but rather a demarcation line (condition (2)) by which
one can test which of infinitely many potential definitions preserves the essential
relation of exploitation and profits in capitalist economies. Thus, if a definition
of exploitation satisfying LE does not generally meet condition (2), then it will
not satisfy PECP, which implies that it is not a proper definition of exploitation
as the UEL.
Some may criticize the methodological positions of PECP and Theorem 4,
claiming that PECP should be proved as a theorem rather than treated as an
axiom. In fact, as Okishio and Morishima did, the methodological standpoint
of the FMT was, assuming a specific definition of exploitation, to verify that
a capitalist economy can be conceived of as exploitative by establishing the
equivalence between exploitation and positive profits.
In contrast, Theorem 4 presumes a correspondence between positive profits
and exploitation for every propertyless employee as an axiom, and then tests
the validity of each alternative definition of exploitation by checking whether
it satisfies this axiom. This methodological standpoint is more likely to be
approved, since PECP should be positioned as a necessary condition for any
proper definition of exploitation, as argued above. Such a methodology has
been implicitly adopted within the debates on the FMT. Typically, whenever
a counterexample was raised against the FMT with a major definition of ex-
ploitation by generalizing the model of economic environments, this criticism
was resolved by proposing an alternative definition and proving that the FMT
is held with this alternative form under the generalized economic model. This
implicitly suggests that, in the overall debate over the FMT, the validity of each
exploitation form has been tested by the robustness of the equivalence between
exploitation and positive profits. However, even if such an interpretation is ac-
ceptable, the structure of the debate over the FMT could not function as a test
of the validity of a form of exploitation, because it may involve an infinite rep-
etition of “counterexample and alternate proposal.” In contrast, by providing
an axiomatic characterization, such as Theorem 4, the validity of every form of
exploitation is testable simply by checking condition (2).
There is another argument to justify the treatment of PECP as an axiom. It
can be shown that in any Leontief economic environment, regardless of whether
the heterogeneity of preferences and skills is involved, the equivalence of positive
profits and the exploitation of each propertyless employee and the equivalence of
zero profit and no exploitation are preserved for any definition of exploitation,
as long as it satisfies LE.
Theorem 5 [Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a)]: For any capitalist economy,­N ;P(A,L); (uν , sν ,ων0)ν∈N
®
, and any RS,
¡
(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N
¢
, PECP
holds for any definition of exploitation satisfying LE.
Proof. Take any definition of exploitation that satisfies LE. Then, for any
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Leontief economy and any RS, (p,w), we can find a profile of reference con-
sumption bundles, (cνe )ν∈W ∈ RnW+ . Then, regardless of the heterogeneity of
welfare functions and skills, the corresponding profile of production activities,¡αcνe ¢ν∈W , is uniquely given by
αcνe ≡
³
−vcνe ,−A (I −A)−1 cνe ,
h
I +A (I −A)−1
i
cνe
´
for each ν ∈W.
Thus, αcνel = vcνe . Let pbαp,w − wαp,wl > 0 for this RS. This implies that, under
the Leontief economy
p = (1 + π) pA+ wL for some π > 0.
Then, as shown in the proof of Theorem 3, pw > v. Thus, by wΛν = pcνe from
LE, we have Λν = pw cνe > vcνe , for any ν ∈ W+. Therefore, according to LE,
any propertyless employee is exploited in terms of the presumed definition of
exploitation.
However, once the production technology of economic environments is re-
placed by a more general type, such as the von Neumann production technol-
ogy, some definitions of exploitation violate PECP, even if they satisfy LE.
Does this suggest that the validity of the basic Marxian perception of capitalist
economies as exploitative crucially depends on the degree of the complexity of
the production technology? Or, does it suggest that such counterexamples are
generated because of incoherency in these definitions, in that they cannot prop-
erly identify the set of exploited agents whenever a more complex production
technology is applied? Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a) take the latter view.
That is, they believe that the complexity of the production technology, such
as the existence of fixed capital and the possibility of joint production, should
not be essential to determining the exploitation status of each agent. Rather,
these counterexamples should be viewed as representing the non-validity of the
presumed definitions of exploitation.
Theorem 4 does not identify a unique definition that meets PECP, but
rather a class of definitions that satisfy condition (2). Yet, Veneziani and Yoshi-
hara (2013a, Corollary 1) show that it has surprising implications concerning
the main approaches in exploitation theory. There are economies in which, for
all ν ∈ W+, condition (2) is never satisfied if αcνe is given by Definition 18 or
19, and so PECP does not hold. In contrast, Definition 20 satisfies condition
(2), and thus PECP holds for all E and all RS:
Corollary 1 [Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a)]: There exists a capitalist econ-
omy, E , and an RS for this economy such that neither Definition 18 nor Defini-
tion 19 satisfies PECP.
The proof of Corollary 1 is given by using the economy defined in Example
1 of section 2.1. In that economy, assume an RS (p∗, 1) with p∗1 > 0. Then,
every agent, ν ∈ W+, consumes cν = b and l.v. (b) = l.v. (b; p∗, 1) = 1 = Λ∗ν ,
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while π∗ > 0. This implies that neither Definition 18 nor Definition 19 satisfies
PECP.
Corollary 2 [Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a)]: For any capitalist economy, E ,
and any RS, Definition 20 satisfies PECP.
These corollaries suggest that, at least among the main competing proposals of
exploitation forms, Definition 20 is the sole appropriate form.
There is another interesting argument to support the New Interpretation
definition of exploitation. Though Definition 20 formulates exploitation as the
unequal exchange of labor, it is also possible to formulate the unequal exchange
of any commodity, k, which is analogical to Definition 20. In this case, is an
argument such as the GCET again established by using such a definition of un-
equal exchange? The answer is negative, according to Veneziani and Yoshihara
(2013c).
Let us define exploitative relations as an unequal exchange of commodity k,
analogical to Definition 20, given as follows:
Definition 21 [Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013c)]: For any capitalist economy,
E , and any RS, ¡(p,w) ; ((cν , lν) ;αν)ν∈N ¢, any agent, ν ∈ N , supplies some
amount of commodity k, ωνk = 0, as a factor of production, and consumes
cν ∈ Rn+ . Then, agent ν is k-exploited if and only if ωνk > τ cναp,wk .
Our concern is whether the equivalence between positive profits and the
existence of k-exploited agents in terms of Definition 21 can be established for
any reproducible solution. Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013c) prove that such an
equivalence does not hold. For instance, assuming an economy with homogeneity
of welfare functions and labor skills, consider a reproducible solution with zero
profit. In such an RS, it follows that, for any ν ∈ N , τ cν = 1N . In contrast,
whenever the initial endowment of capital good k is unequal, there generically
exists an agent, ν0, endowed with ων0k > 1N ωk. Then, it is not difficult to
construct an equilibrium with zero profit under which this agent is deemed to
be k-exploited, which violates the equivalence of k-exploitation with positive
profits in terms of Definition 21.
Summarizing these arguments, if we take the New Interpretation definition
of exploitation, such as in Definition 20, it follows that the unequal exchange of
any productive factor other than labor and the UEL are not logically equivalent.
Therefore, there can be no room for criticism against this definition by means
of an analogical argument of the GCET, unlike the criticism of the Okishio—
Morishima definition.
5 Concluding remarks
One of the most prominent contributions of Okishio (1963) is that he inspired
research beyond the classical Marxian theory of surplus value to the great con-
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troversies on the proper definitions of exploitation. Though the Okishio de-
finition of exploitation (Definition 2 in this paper) was essentially faithful to
the labor theory of value and theory of surplus value, the sequence of the later
controversies suggests the limitation and noneligibility of such a classical def-
inition. It was the property relation theory of exploitation by Roemer (1982,
1994), proposed as an alternative to the Okishio—Morishima approach, that was
to prove influential in the fields of economics and political philosophy beyond
the Marxian camp. However, recent developments of exploitation theory, such
as Vrousalis (2013) and Wright (2000), have successfully defined the notion of
exploitation as social relations of the UEL independently of the classical labor
theory of value and theory of surplus value. According to these new arguments,
the primary normative concern of exploitation has been restored. Along with
this recent trend, the present controversy regarding the proper definitions of
exploitation as the UEL is the New Interpretation type (Definition 20 in this
paper). Though this definition is also independent of the classical framework
of labor value and surplus value, the validity of this definition is verified by
Veneziani and Yoshihara (2013a,c) through an axiomatic analysis of PECP.
Note that there are other axiomatic analyses to support the New Interpreta-
tion definition, such as those of Yoshihara (2010) and Yoshihara and Veneziani
(2009). Yoshihara (2010) formulates Class-Exploitation Correspondence
Principle (CECP), another important argument in exploitation theory, as an
axiom that any proper definition of exploitation should meet, and then charac-
terizes the class of proper definitions of exploitation satisfying this axiom. As a
result, the New Interpretation definition has been shown to be the unique and
proper definition among the current definitions. Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009)
introduce an axiom called Relational Exploitation to capture the social re-
lational feature of exploitation as the UEL, and then show that a small number
of rather weak axioms, including Relational Exploitation, can completely
characterize the New Interpretation definition.
Given this current standpoint, it may be concluded that the New Interpre-
tation definition is appropriate as a form of exploitation with which to conceive
a capitalist economy as exploitative within a rather broad class of economic
environments. Then, it remains to examine whether the New Interpretation
definition can be deemed appropriate even in economic environments with het-
erogeneous labor. However, as a prerequisite of this subject, we may have to
identify a proper measure with which to aggregate each vector of multiple hetero-
geneous labor contents. This problem is discussed by Veneziani and Yoshihara
(2013d), who axiomatically derive one proper measure.
Secondly, even if it is shown to be valid to conceive the capitalist economy
as exploitative, it would be more desirable in terms of economics to study the
degree of seriousness of the exploitation in each society. Proceeding with this
line of research would require a new subject to identify the proper measure of
the degree of exploitation.
Thirdly, the New Interpretation definition of exploitation, such as that shown
in Definition 20 in this paper, suggests that the non-exploitative resource alloca-
tions should be nothing but the proportional solution proposed by Roemer and
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Silvestre (1993). Though it is not eligible to reduce the issues of exploitation to
the issues of distributive injustice, as argued in section 3.3, it is still an intrin-
sically interesting problem to study the ethical properties of non-exploitative
allocations. With regard to this point, Roemer (2010; 2013) recently proved
that the proportional solution, that is, the allocation rule of non-exploitation,
would be implementable in a moral state of society in which every citizen be-
haves in accordance with the Kantian categorical imperative. Such a moral
state of society is formulated by Roemer (2010) as a social state of Kantian
equilibrium. This line of research would be interesting for Marxian economists
to study further.
Lastly, this paper has mainly discussed the generation of exploitative rela-
tions in perfectly competitive equilibria in a capitalist economy. However, we
have not addressed the persistency of exploitative relations,12 nor the gener-
ation of exploitative relations under capitalist economies with imperfect labor
contracts.13 The former problem would be relevant, in a broader sense, to
the controversies over the Okishio Theorem [Okishio (1961)], another signifi-
cant contribution by Nobuo Okishio. We leave this point as a topic of further
research.
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